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CVE-2026-0766

CVE IDCVE-2026-0766
Vendor DispositionRejected, not a vulnerability
Published2026-01-23
Issuing CNAZero Day Initiative (ZDI-26-032)
Claimed SeverityHigh (CVSS 8.8, CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Timeline

This CVE is formally disputed. The dispute is open and being pursued through the CVE Program's process; the assessment below is Open WebUI's position in the meantime.

DateEvent
2025-10ZDI submits the underlying report through Open WebUI's security channel. Open WebUI closes it as out of scope and not a vulnerability under its published security policy, but does so without giving the reporter a written explanation at the time, which was a mistake on Open WebUI's part.
2026-01-23ZDI publishes the CVE (ZDI-26-032).
2026-05-04Open WebUI files a formal dispute with the CVE Program and notifies ZDI directly. Neither ZDI nor the CVE Program responds.
2026-06-15Open WebUI files another dispute with the CVE Program; the Secretariat directs it to the issuing CNA (ZDI), which owns the record. The request is subsequently closed.
2026-07-02With the CNA non-responsive, Open WebUI escalates the dispute a third time, to the CVE Program's Root / Top-Level Root under the CVE Record Dispute Policy (v2.0.0).
2026-07-06Under the CVE Program's record-dispute procedure, the Program forwards the dispute to the issuing CNA (ZDI) for its determination.

As of 2026-07-06, the dispute is before the issuing CNA (ZDI) for its determination and the CVE record has not been amended. This disposition stands as Open WebUI's official assessment.


What the CVE Claims

The function load_tool_module_by_id in backend/open_webui/utils/plugin.py allegedly allows a low-privileged authenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary Python code by submitting a Tool whose source contains arbitrary Python, which the function then passes to exec().


Why This Is Not a Vulnerability

load_tool_module_by_id is the core mechanism by which Open WebUI loads user-authored Tools. Tools are Python modules authored by the user and executed by the server. This is the explicit feature design. The function reads the Tool source from the database, parses its frontmatter, and calls exec() on the source to instantiate the module. There is no input "validation" to be added; the input is the Python module the user has submitted to be executed.

This mirrors the design of every other code-extension system: Jupyter executes notebook cells, n8n executes Code nodes, Home Assistant executes python_script files. Calling exec() on the submitted code is the feature, not a defect.

Access Control

The routes that invoke load_tool_module_by_id are gated by user.role == 'admin' or by the workspace.tools permission, which is disabled by default. Granting workspace.tools is documented as equivalent to giving the user shell access to the server. There is no path by which an unprivileged user can reach this function.

Severity

Because this is intended behavior and not a vulnerability, no CVSS score applies to it; the published 8.8 (High) scores the software's designed ability to load and execute user-authored Tool code. Separately, and only if the record is scored at all, the vector's PR:L (privileges required, low) is inaccurate: the routes that reach this function require an administrator or the root-equivalent workspace.tools permission, which is PR:H. This is recorded for completeness and does not bear on the disposition, which is out of scope on the intended-behavior basis regardless of severity.

Applicable Security Policy Rules

  • Rule 10: The Tools feature is designed to execute user-provided Python code on the server. Reports involving Tools or Functions are closed as intended behavior.
  • Rule 9: "Pasting untrusted code into Functions/Tools" is explicitly cited as out-of-scope.
  • Rule 1: Expected protocol behavior is not a vulnerability.

Impact to Users

No action required. This CVE describes intended functionality. Tools execute Python code on the server by design. If you have granted workspace.tools to untrusted users, review the Plugin Security documentation.


References

This content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a warranty, guarantee, or contractual commitment. Open WebUI is provided "as is." See your license for applicable terms.